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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ALIENS- EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE DOES
NOT REQUIRE EXTENSION OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT STATUS TO ALIENS FROM
NON-CONTIGUOUS COUNTRIES.
Petitioner, a native of the Philippines, entered the United States in
September 1968, as an immigrant admitted for permanent residence.' Peti-
tioner later returned to the 5 hilippines for 11 months, thereafter re-
entering the United States for short periods of time each year using her
green alien registration card.' On November 17, 1973, she attempted to
enter the country through Hawaii but was excluded by the immigration
inspector for lack of a valid immigration visa' or entry document.' An
immigration judge ordered her deported, finding that she had abandoned
her permanent residence in the United States.' The Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal. She then filed a petition of habeas
corpus with the United States District Court for the Central District of
California,' arguing that the disallowance of her claim for resident status,
while allowing such status for similarly situated citizens of nations contig-
uous to the United States, denied her equal protection under the 14th
Amendment. The court held that the petitioner was a special immigrant
or alien commuter' entitled to enter the country using only a green card.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1970) provides that:
The term "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" means the status of having
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States
as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having
changed.
2 8 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (1970) provides that:
Every alien in the United States who has been registered and fingerprinted under
the provisions of the Alien Registration Act 1940, or under the provisions of this
chapter shall be issued a certificate of alien registration or an alien registration
receipt card in such form and manner and at such time as shall be prescribed under
regulations issued by the Attorney General.
8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1970).
Id.
Judge Newton T. Jones found that petitioner resided permanently in the Philippines,
having abandoned her residence in the United States, i.e., her status of having been accorded
the privilege of residing permanently in the United States had changed under the terms of 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1970). See note 1 supra.
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1970) provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any alien against whom a final
order of exclusion has been made heretofore or hereafter under the provisions of §
1226 of this title or comparable provisions of any prior Act may obtain judicial
review of such order by habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise.
I. & N. S. Gen. Order No. 86 (1927). This order classified alien commuters as special
immigrants lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence under the mean-
ing of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1970). "Residence" was based upon a legal fiction that the
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On appeal to the 9th circuit, held, reversed. Denial of a special immigrant
status to a citizen of the Philippines is not a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause when a distinction drawn between contiguity and non-
contiguity has a rational basis in policy. Alvarez v. District Director of
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 539 F.2d 1220
(9th Cir. 1976).
Congress has been granted broad powers by the Constitution to control
the naturalization and immigration of aliens.' In recognition of this author-
ity, the judiciary has deferred to Congress9 except in those instances where
long-renowned enactments appear to exceed constitutional strictures.'0
One result of this judicial deference has been that discrimination among
classes of aliens has withstood constitutional attack" better than has dis-
crimination between aliens and United States citizens,' 2 the former being
subject to a mere rational relation test,'3 while the latter is subject to the
more stringent strict scrutiny standard."
At issue in the instant case is the unique status accorded aliens residing
in nations contiguous to the United States. These aliens have been given
a status of special immigrant by the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice (INS), which is even broader than that provided statutorily.'" An immi-
grant in this statutory category is defined as one "lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad."'"
alien resided at his place of employment in the United States and made temporary visits out
of the country at night when he returned to his home in a contiguous country.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. "The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization."
I See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), finding that the federal government has
the sole authority to control immigration. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 713 (1892).
,o See Fong Yue Ting v. United States at 713, where the Court postulated that "[tihe
power to exclude or expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in
the political departments of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty and by act of
Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to regulations so estab-
lished except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute,
or is required by the paramount law of the Constitution to intervene." (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (1975).
2 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) where the equal protection clause was
applied to find state welfare laws which discriminated against aliens unconstitutional. See
also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Recent Development, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 206
(1974).
'" Dunn v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974); Uribe-
Temblador v. Rosenberg 423 F.2d 717 (1970).
" See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), on "discrete and insular
minorities" and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), on alienage as a suspect classifica-
tion. See also Recent Development, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 187, 190 (1977).
,1 Gen. Order No. 86, supra note 7. This order classified commuters as immigrants and,
because they were born in the Western Hemisphere, exempted them from ordinary visa and
quota requirements.
" 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(B) (1970).
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Under this definition, many Mexican and Canadian workers cross the
border using only their "green cards,"" where they would have been denied
access had they been from any other country.
The reason for this variance is the INS decision not to challenge many
Canadian or Mexican workers' foreign residence, construing their return-
ing home each night to be a mere "temporary visit abroad." Even though
this variance has been challenged in several cases,"8 in the leading case,
Gooch v. Clark,9 the 9th circuit upheld the validity of the INS practice in
the face of an attack by the AFL-CIO. There the court of appeals first
determined that the commuters were in fact immigrants, since they did
not fall within the defined characteristics for nonimmigrant aliens. 0 The
court then interpreted the phrase "lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence" as a term of art intended to mean the status of having the privilege
of residency in the United States, rather than actual residence.', Finally,
as to the requirement that the immigrant be "returning from a temporary
visit abroad" the Gooch court concluded that the INS acceptance of a
commuter's nightly or seasonal return to his foreign residence was not
beyond the scope of the statute.2
This view was expressly adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Saxbe v. Bustos,"3 where the Court held that the INS scheme applied
to seasonal as well as daily commuters. 2' In reaching this decision the
Supreme Court expressed what the Gooch court had only suggested,
namely that the long-standing administrative construction of the statute21
added a "gloss" or qualification to statutory language which on its face
seemed unqualified. 2 In this case the "gloss" was strengthened by the fact
'1 These commuters carry an alien registration receipt card (form 1-151), commonly called
a "green card" and use it as a border-crossing card in compliance with the documentation
requirements of the Attorney General of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (1970).
" See, e.g., Texas State AFL-CIO v. Kennedy, 330 F.2d 217, cert. denied 379 U.S. 826
(1964).
" 433 F.2d 74 (1970), cert. denied sub nor., Gooch v. Mitchell, 402 U.S. 995 (1971).
Id. at 78. See In re H-O-5, I. & N. Dec. 716 (Bd. Imm. App. 1954); Karnuth v. United
States ex rel Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929). See also C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.19 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
2 433 F.2d at 78, 79. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (20). See In re F, Bd. Imm. App. A-630567 (1946);
In re H-O- 5, I. & N. Dec. 716 (Bd. Imm. App. 1954). In the case of commuters, a legal fiction
is used to equate regular employment with domicile. In re Burciaga-Saicedo, 11 I. & N. Dec.
665 (1966); In re Wighton, 13 I. & N. Dec. 683 (1971).
" Id. at 80. The court based its conclusion upon cases which had upheld such finding under
language of a similar import in the predecessor statute to the present statute. See Barrese v.
Ryan 203 F. Supp. 880 (D. Conn. 1962); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of
North America v. Rogers, 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1960), where the references to seasonal
workers is only dicta.
23 419 U.S. 65 (1974).
1, Id. at 70.
2 The practice started in 1927; see note 7 supra.
" 419 U.S. at 74. See also Massachusetts Trustees v. United States, 377 U.S. 235 (1964);
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
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that Congress had long been aware of the particular practice and had taken
no action to change it.Y
The practical importance of the less stringent "rational relation" stan-
dard of review was emphasized by the court when it noted that the policy
behind the INS practice was particularly relevant. 2 Given the high num-
ber of inter-country commuters, a drastic change in INS policy would
create serious economic difficulties in the border areas, 29 thereby damaging
United States political relations with Canada and Mexico. 0
The court of appeals in the instant case recognized this logic when ap-
plied to Canadian and Mexican workers. However, it refused to extend the
Gooch and Saxbe view to permit the green card entry to workers from non-
contiguous countries, since different economic and political considerations
were involved."
Having defined the scope of the regulatory scheme, the court of appeals
next considered petitioner's contention that such an interpretation was
unconstitutional, because it deprived her of equal protection of the law.
Applying the rational relation test,32 the court found a rational relation
between the policy of maintaining an economic balance in border areas and
thus good relations with Mexico and Canada and attempts to achieve that
policy. Consequently, this argument also failed.Y
Petitioner, in the alternative, asserted a putative status as an ordinary
special immigrant rather than as a commuter, that is, one admitted with-
out the help of the legal fiction that employment connotes residence.3 ' In
order to become a special immigrant, one must have an unrelinquished
permanent residence within the United States.u On the facts of this case,
though, the court of appeals found that petitioner failed to satisfy this
requirement since she had both her residence and her place of employment
in the Philippines for eleven months during the year.38
27 See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF
THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 616 (1950); SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY AMENDING IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
15-16 (1965).
" For a detailed examination of the policy issues in this area see Note, A liens in the Fields:
The "Green-Card Commuter" Under the Immigration and Naturalization Laws, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 1750 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Stanford Note].
2 SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, MIGRATORY FARM LABOR PROBLEM IN
UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 83, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1969); Immigration and Nationality
Act Amendments, Hearings on H.R. 9112, H.R. 15092, H.R. 17370 Before Subcomm. No. 1
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 205-207 (1969).
' 419 U.S. at 70. The Court used an affidavit submitted by Secretary of State Rogers to
the district court below to bolster its position.
3' 539 F.2d at 1223-24.
.2 See note 13 supra.
539 F.2d at 1224.
, See note 21 supra.
3. 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1) (1977); Lesto v. Day, 21 F.2d 307 (1927).
-" 539 F.2d at 1225.
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In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Saxbe v. Bustos, the
decision in this case is a proper one. In Saxbe the Court firmly announced
the policy behind the commuter scheme. In order to maintain a political
and economic balance in the border areas, only residents of the border
countries involved can be commuters. Additionally, commuters come into
the United States to work, whereas petitioner had no job. Only very rarely
will aliens from noncontiguous countries have the economic tie contem-
plated for commuters.
The Court's holding on the equal protection issue was also consistent
with the policy behind prior case law. This was not a situation where an
alien was denied a freedom allowed to an American citizen. It was a situa-
tion where an alien was denied a privilege accorded to other aliens. The
status of alienage is not the basis for discrimination since both the haves
and the have-nots are aliens. Thus, the INS, as a part of the Executive
Branch, 3 may set procedures which are rationally related to accomplishing
the goal of furthering friendly relations with Canada and Mexico by main-
taining any economic balance in the border areas. Since the economic
considerations present in dealing with immigrants from contiguous coun-
tries do not usually exist with immigrants from noncontiguous countries,
there is no justification for equal treatment. However, in view of both of
the issues raised by this type of case and the likelihood of further challenge
on constitutional discrimination grounds, 3 Congress should, at a mini-
mum, revise the immigration laws to reflect current practice. This revision
would have the virtue of clarifying the law for aliens seeking entry, espe-
cially in an area which is so heavily litigated.39
Laurie C. Gregory
3 The INS is a division of the Justice Department.
31 Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974); Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74 (1970), cert. denied
sub nom. Gooch v. Mitchell, 402 U.S. 995 (1971). See also Stanford Note, supra note 28.
11 For a good discussion of the economic problems and cases see H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 43-90 (2d ed. 1976).
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